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Abstract
Thris  paper describes  a  new inceiltive-based  pollutioni  Hollot, Ininer Mongolia.  SucCessful  implemilenltatioln  of
control program  in  Chinia  in which  the  environmental  thcse programs  at two very  different  levels of economic
performance  of firms  is  rated and  reported  to the public,  anid  institutional  developmeilt suggests that public
Firms  are rared  from best to worst  uisinig five  colors-  disclosure  shouIld  be  feasible  in most of China.  The
green,  bltue,  ellow, red,  and black-and  the ratings  arc  Zhenjianig and Hohhot  experienices  have  also  shown  thlat
disseminated  to the  public thioughi  the  media. The  performianice  disclosuire  cani  significanitly  redtice
impact  has been  substantial,  SuggCStilg that public  pollition,  even  in settings  where  environimiienital
disclosure  provides  a  significanit  incentive  for  firms  to  nongovernmental  organiizationis  are not very  active  and
iniprove their environmental  performance.  there  is nio  formial  channel  for public participation  in
The paper  focuses on  the  experience  of the  first two  environmental  regUlation.
disclosure  programs,  in Zhenijiaig,  Iiangsu lProvince and
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telephone 202-473- 1449,  fax 202-522-3230, emlail address y  dsouzaixvorldbaiink.org.  l'olicv Researcih Working Papers are
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jbi(@kworldbarnk.org,  or  clwheelerI  @(.worldbank.org.  Septeiber  2c002.  (28  pages)
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d/t  eje  pinlenlt issofesAn41  objiectiv.e of ib7e  series is to ge  t thve  finduinlgs ouwt  quickldy.C  eveu  if th7e  pr  escutation)s a7re  less thanl)  full  p1  /olishsed.  Th7e
pa/iers carre the miiiies of the authors and should he citcd accordclnn4v.  rTe findings. interpretationis,  and conclusions expressed in this
puaper are cntirely those of the aulithors. They do not necessaril/!  represent the  view' of the World Ba,uk,  its Executitve  Directors, or the
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Public disclosure of firms' envirommental performance  has been characterized as the
"third wave" of environmental  regulation, after command-and-control  and market-based
approaches  (Tietenberg,  1998).  Its growing popularity stems from initial evidence that
disclosure has reduced  emissions in North America and Southeast Asia,2 as well as the
perception that it is a low-cost regulatory option because it does not require formal
enforcement procedures.  China's State Environmental  Protection Agency (SEPA) has
become interested in public disclosure because China's pollution problem remains severe,
despite long-standing attempts to control it with traditional regulatory instruments.
Chinese regulators  have also been influenced by the rapid spread of pollution
disclosure systems to other Asian countries after pilot programs were initiated by
Indonesia and Philippines in 1995 (World Bank,  1999).  As a result, China has begun
pilot experiments with "third wave"  regulation.  Since late  1998, supported by the World
Bank's InfoDev Program, the authors have been working with China's State
Environmental  Protection Administration (SEPA) to establish GreenWatch, a public
disclosure program for polluters.  Adapted from Indonesia's PROPER, the GreenWatch
program rates firms' environmental  performance from best to worst in five colors -
green, blue, yellow, red and black.  The ratings are disseminated to the public through the
media.  Two municipal-level pilot GreenWatch programs have been implemented,  in
Zhernjiang,  Jiangsu Province, and Hohhot, Inner Mongolia.  Reaction to the pilot
programs has been positive,  and Jiangsu Province has decided to promote province-wide
2 For evidence  on toxic  emissions reduction  in the US, see  Konar  and Cohen (1996)  and Tietenberg  and
Wheeler  (2001).  The  imnpact  of disclosure  on  two  water  pollutants  (biochemical  oxygen  demand  and
suspended  solids)  has been analyzed  for Canada  (Foulon,  Lanoie  and Laplante,  2000),  Indonesia  (Afsah
and Vincent,  1997)  and Philippines  (World Bank, 1999).
3implementation of GreenWatch.  SEPA currently plans to launch pilot programs in other
areas, in preparation for nationwide implementation of public disclosure.
This paper describes China's GreenWatch program, its results to date, and the
implications for national  adoption of public disclosure.  In Section 2, we discuss the role
of disclosure in China's approach to environmental management.  Sections 3 and 4
describe the Zhenjiang  and Hohhot programs, respectively.  Section 5 summarizes the
lessons learned to date from the GreenWatch experience,  and Section 6 provides further
discussion of the use of information  strategies for pollution management.
2.  Industrial Pollution  Control in China
2.1 China's Industrial Pollution Problem
China's industrial growth has been extremely rapid during the period of economic
reform.  In the 1990's, the output of the country's millions of industrial enterprises has
increased by more than  15% annually.  While industry has helped lift tens of millions of
people out of poverty,  its polluting emissions have also produced serious environmental
damage.  Recent research (Bolt, et al., 2001) suggests that China's air pollution problem
is the worst in the world.  With over 300,000 premature deaths per year, China accounts
for over 40% of the total for the developing world -- more than twice the number for
South Asia, which has a comparable population.  Similar percentages  characterize  other
measures of health damage.
Chinese industry is a primary source of this problem.  China's State Environimental
Protection Administration (SEPA) estimates that in 2000, industry accounted for about
40% of the nation's water pollution, and about  80% of its air pollution.  For this reason,
4SEPA. has continuously declared control of industrial pollution to be one of the top
priorities for Chinese regulators.
During the past decade, conventional regulation  has probably saved millions of
lives lby helping hold the growth rate of total emissions well below the growth rate of
industry.  However, the continuing severity of pollution has led the Chinese government
to experiment with public pollution disclosure as a possible complement  to existing
measures.
2.2 The Role of Public Disclosure  in Chinese Industrial Pollution  Control
Traditional command-and-control  approaches  and economic instruments have been
widely employed in Chinese environmental  management.  However, the enforcement of
those policy instruments  has generally been weak (World Bank, 2001).  Previous
experience  in the US, Indonesia and elsewhere has demonstrated that public disclosure of
environmental performance  can promote regulatory compliance  for several reasons.
First,, disclosure provides an additional incentive for improved performance because
many companies value their public image.  Second, ratings provide a valuable
environmental management  tool for enterprises, which in many cases have never
undertaken a comprehensive assessment of their environmental  performance.
Third, public disclosure can strengthen the regulatory institutions themselves.  In
most cases, Chinese regulators already have the information needed for public rating of
environmental performance.  Many agencies  receive regular, facility-level reports on
emissions, pollution control investments, field inspections  and accidents.  However,
public disclosure can significantly raise the ante by pressuring regulators toward more
accurate and timely record-keeping.  With its credibility on the line in a disclosure
5program, a regulatory agency has a strong incentive to maintain high internal standards.
This is particularly true for emissions monitoring, which provides the foundation for an
environmental  performance rating system.
Fourth, disclosure encourages public participation in environmental  regulation.
Insufficient access to environmental information is a major reason for the weakness  of
public participation  in China's environmental  management (Wang et al, 2002).  Public
performance  ratings make it much easier for concerned  citizens to identify serious
polluters and pressure them to improve their performance.
Finally, the experiences of Hohhot Municipality and Zhenjiang City suggest that
disclosure also changes  the balance of environmental  initiative between polluters and
regulators.  Prior to disclosure in these areas, local enterprises generally resisted
regulators'  attempts to monitor them more closely.  After disclosure attracted widespread
publicity through the news media, however, companies perceived  an impact on their
public image and the market image of their products.  Enterprises that improved their
performance  immediately requested new monitoring reports,  so that their public ratings
could be improved as well.  Enterprises with poor ratings shifted from passive resistance
to active solicitation of inspections, as a means of improving their ratings.  At the same
time, enterprises with good ratings felt continued pressure to maintain their
environmental  performance,  to avoid complaints from the public about backsliding.
2.3  Support for Disclosure  in China
Although public ratings are relatively new in China, there is ample legal, social,
technical  and institutional support for disclosure.
6Legal support
Chinese law provides  ample precedent for the use of public disclosure to control
pollution.  For example, the Constitution of the PRC states that, "all rights in the PRC
belong to the  people.  The people manage state affairs, economic and cultural affairs,
and social  affairs by various means in accordance  with the law."  For regulation, this
principle accords the people the right to supervise the environmental  work of state
authorities, as well as discipline them for illegal behavior.  In the Environmental
Protection  Law of the PRC, Article 6 prescribes that, "all units and individuals have the
obligation  to protect the environment, and  have the right to impeach and accuse units
and  individuals that  pollute and damage the environment;  " Article  11  prescribes that,
"the competent administrative  department of  environmental  protection under the State
Council establishes  monitoring  systems, constitutes monitoring  criteria,  organizes
monitoring  networks with related  departments, and  strengthens management of
environmental  monitoring. The competent administrative  departments of environmental
prot'ection under the State Council, provincial and municipal  governments shall
regularly  publicize environmental status reports.  "  Similar provisions appear in China's
Air Pollution Prevention and Control Law, Water Pollution Prevention and Control Law,
Marine Environment Protection Law, and Environmental Noise Prevention and Control
Law.
Information disclosure  and pubic participation also feature prominently  in
government declarations,  as well as international  conventions signed by China.  For
example,  in the Rio Declaration,  signed during the United Nations Conference on
Environment  and Development in  1992, the 1  Oth Principle prescribes that individuals
7should have  access to government information  about environmental hazards in their
communities,  and should be able to participate in decisions about regulation of these
hazards.  Another  example is provided  by the Chinese State Council's Decision on
Several  Issues Related to Environmental  Protection, which encourages  public
participation  in environmental regulation and defines an important role for the news
media in publicizing actions that damage the environment.
Social support
In the information  age, public opinion has proven to be a powerful force in every
society.  This force is best mobilized by the major print and broadcast media,  since their
content is easily understood by the public.  In 1997,  the Chinese Central Television
Program disclosed non-compliance  by some polluters in the Huai  River Basin.  As a
result, both the polluters  and the local authorities came under great pressure to improve
their performance.  Currently,  environmental protection ranks high among the concerns
of urban residents.  In 1999, the Social Survey Institute of China (SSIC) surveyed the
public-agenda priorities of households in Beijing, Shanghai,  Tianjin, Guangzhou,
Chongqing, Wuhan and other cities.  The survey covered issues related to corruption,  law
enforcement,  inflation, equity and environmental  protection.  Corruption was the primary
concern,  followed by environmental protection, with 66% of households rating the latter
as very important.  Given this concern, social support for public disclosure of
environmental  information should be strong
8Technical support
Accurate information provides the essential foundation for public ratings of
environmental  performance.  Accuracy,  in turn, depends on the quality of information-
gathering technology, and on the reliability of record-keeping by the authorities.  After
establishment of the national task force on environmental monitoring 20 years ago, China
has been making significant progress on this front.  At present, there are over 4,800
environmental  monitoring units in China, employing over 60,000 people.  The current
system uses standardized monitoring equipment, deployed to cover both the ambient
environment and polluting emissions.  It is overseen by over 3,600 environmental
supervision units, with a working staff of over 26,000 people.
Institutional precedents
Although comprehensive public disclosure is new in China, the government has
previously recognized superior environmental performance.  Since  1989, SEPA and its
predecessor (NEPA) have maintained  a list of enterprises with excellent environmental
ratings.  Enterprises are listed on the recommendation of provincial environmental
protection bureaus, after vetting by the national Panel of Evaluation and Assessment
whose representatives come from the national agency, the State Environmental
Monitoring Station of China, and other ministries.  By 1997, this assessment had been
conducted 6 times, and 500 enterprises had been awarded the title, 'Nationwide
Advanced Enterprise on Environmental  Protection.'  Over time, numerous enterprises
have been removed from the list for failure to maintain standards  consistent with the
award.  However, over 180 enterprises have retained their excellent ratings.
9Potential barriers
The most important resistance  to environmental performance disclosure programs
in China may come from local governments.  Chinese leaders in the central  government
have strongly supported the public disclosure strategy.  In 2001, Premier Zhu Rongji
stated explicitly that no environmental  information  should be kept  secret.  SEPA's
minister, Mr. Xie Zhenhua, has also expressed strong support for environmental
performance  disclosure.  However, some local governments  have resisted on the grounds
that disclosure may threaten local employment by reducing polluters' profits.  In addition,
some may be concerned about the additional administrative costs imposed by disclosure
programs.  Finally, local authorities may simply worry about whether they can implement
such programs effectively,  and how disclosure may affect relations between local
companies and communities.  Under these circumstances,  financial support from
provincial or national authorities may be needed to underwrite the startup costs for local
disclosure programs.
3.  Public Disclosure in Zhenjiang
3.1  Program Design
Zhenjiang is located in Jiangsu, a relatively high-income province whose GDP per
capita was US$2,300 in  1999.  Zhenjiang's Environmental  Information Disclosure
Program reflects design principles that have proven successful in previous disclosure
programs in Indonesia and the Philippines.  First, the performance  rating system is simple,
so that its implications can be easily understood and accepted by firms and the public.
10Second, it identifies both superior and inferior performance.  Finally, the ratings are
color-coded for easy communication by the broadcast and print media.
The system divides industrial firms'  environmental performance into five
symmetric  rating categories, with two (black, red) denoting inferior performance;  one
(yellow) denoting compliance with minimum emission regulations but failure to comply
with stricter requirements; and two ratings  (blue, green) denoting superior performance.
Because it recognizes three performance levels for firms that comply with basic emission
requirements,  the system provides incentives for continuous improvement.  Even for non-
compliant firms, the system rewards efforts to improve by recognizing two levels of
performance.
3.2  Performance Ratings
The program's color-coded ratings are generated by a detailed accounting of
environmental  performance,  whose major elements are summarized in Table 1. The
ratings  system draws on four principle sources of information:  reports on industrial
firms' polluting emissions; inspection reports on their environmental  management;
records of public complaints, regulatory actions  and penalties;  and surveys that record
characteristics of the firms that are relevant for rating environmental performance.
Compliance  with regulations
The rating system incorporates  six dimensions of environmental pollution: water,
air, noise, solid waste, electromagnetic'radiation,  and radioactive contamination.  It
includes emissions information for 13 regulated air and water pollutants: chemical
oxygen demand,  suspended solids, oil, volatile hydroxybenzene,  chromium, cyanide, lead,arsenic, mercury, cadmium, flue dust, industrial dust and sulfur dioxide.  Pollutant
discharges are rated by total quantity and concentration.  Solid wastes are rated in three
dimensions:  production,  disposal, and recycling.
Management behavior
This element involves  a detailed accounting of behavior in several dimensions.
Environmental  management effort is graded with respect to:  timely payment of pollution
discharge  fees; implementation of the national Pollutant Discharge Reporting and
Registering Program,  the Standardized Waste Management  Measure,  and the Three
Synchronizations  Program3; and variables related to internal environmental  monitoring,
staff training, and internal document preparation.  In addition, the rating system considers
the firm's efficiency of resource use; its technological level (e.g., implementation of the
national  Cleaner Production Audit Program);  and the quality of its environmental
management  system.
Social impact
Indicators in this category include the firm's record with respect to public complaints,
pollution accidents, illegal pollution, and administrative penalties.
3.3  Program  lImplementation
Ratings construction
The Zhenjiang rating system uses a series of yes/no questions to translate its
multidimensional  performance indicators into 5 color codes.  Figure 1 shows how this is
This program's  purpose  is to ensure  that new construction  projects include pollution  abatement  facilities
that meet state emission and effluent standards. Under the program,  a new industrial enterprise  or one that
wishes  to  expand  or  change  its  production  process  must register  its  plans with  the  local  environmental
protection  bureau  and  design  (first  synchronization),  construct  (second  synchronization),  and  begin  to
12done, while Table 1 provides a detailed accounting by category.  Initially-selected  firms
were enterprises classified as large on the basis of plant size, production value and
reported pollution discharge  load.  Subsequently,  the program has expanded to cover
smaller firms.  The Zhenjiang Environmental  Protection Burean (EPB) uses its own
records to develop information  on the firms' polluting emissions, management behavior
and social impacts.
Disclosure process
A distinctive feature of the rating-disclosure process  is its "Inform-Respond-Check-
Disclose" reciprocal  mechanism,  in which industrial firms can exchange  comments  about
their ratings with the EPB prior to disclosure.  By reconsidering and rechecking at the
firms' request,  the EPB encourages  (but is not required to gain) their acceptance of the
final ratings, as well as promoting a more detailed  environmental accounting by the firms
themselves.  After setting the ratings, the EPB sends them to the program's Steering
]3oard for final checking  and ratification  prior to public disclosure.  The Steering Board is
led by the deputy mayor in charge of environmental protection, and its members come
from the EPB and other relevant administrative departments  and institutions.  Its main
responsibility is to ratify the ratings and transmit them to the firms and the news media.
To ensure accurate press reports, the EPB invites reporters to a detailed presentation of
the program, including an explanation of the rating system and a demonstration of the
computer program that is used for ratings development.
operate  (third  synchronization)  pollution  control  facilities  simultaneously  with the  principal  part of the
enterprise's  production activities.
13Pilot ratings
The pilot program began in June,  1999, with selection and rating of 101  firms
drawn from several industry sectors.  During the pilot phase, the Zhenjiang EPB regularly
reported its progress to the municipal government and the media.  The firms were
informed of their pilot ratings in 1998.  Ten firms were de-listed during this initial period
because of data quality problems, leaving 91  firms for disclosure.  The latter accounted
for 95% of measured pollution emissions in Zhenjiang,  as well as 65%  of the city's
economic  output.
The pilot ratings, displayed in Figure 2a, indicated widespread deficiencies, with
69%  of the firms rated as Yellow, Red or Black.  However,  31% demonstrated superior
performance even  in the pilot disclosure period, and a few earned the highest (Green)
rating.
Public disclosure
In May, 2000, the Zhenjiang municipal government officially recognized the
program and issued a formal "Notice of Implementation of the Environmental
Information Program in Zhenjiang City."  The municipal government also presided over
the first disclosure at a press conference on July 26th, 2000.  Other participants included
representatives of all 91  rated firms, the Program Steering Board, and deputies from the
Jiangsu Province EPB and the EPBs of other cities in Jiangsu.  The Steering Board
publicly released the ratings, and the firms' representatives accepted and commented on
them.  For several  days after the press conference, local newspapers and TV stations
continually reported the event,  the results of the first disclosure, and promises by rated
firms to improve their environmental performance.
14The results show that many firms chose to improve their environmental
performance during the one-year grace period between pilot disclosure  and public
disclosure.  The number of superior performers doubled,  from 31% of the rated firms to
62%  (Figure 2b).  The pressure  from public disclosure  clearly reinforced another program,
"One Control and Double Attainments (OCDA)", that was implemented in Zhenjiang
during the period  1998-2000.  The objectives of the latter program were full compliance
with local and national concentration-based  emission standards by enterprises  in
Zhenjiang City.
Industrial environmental  performance in Zhenjiang improved significantly after
combined implementation  of OCDA and public disclosure.  As a result, the disclosure
program Steering Board announced  its support for annual disclosures.
4.  Public Disclosure  in Hohhot
4.1  Program Design
Hohhot is located in Inner Mongolia Autonomous District, a northern,  relatively
poor region of China whose GDP per capita was US$1,100  in 1999.  Hohhot's regulatory
capacity is less-developed than Zhenjiang's,  so its disclosure program is designed for
cost-effective  implementation in a relatively weak institutional setting.  In Hohhot, the
program  focuses on firms that meet three criteria: major contributions  to local pollution;
management with some independence of action; and possible susceptibility to public
pressure for improvement.  To maximize the incentive effects of disclosure, the ratings
standards are set to reveal a broad distribution of relative environmental  performance.
The three design principles  employed in Zhenjiang are also followed in Hohhot.
15Performance  ratings
Hohhot uses the same color ratings as Zhenjiang, ranging from green (best
performance)  through blue, yellow and red, to black (worst performance).  Specific
grading criteria are summarized  in Figure 3. The performance  ratings cover only
discharges  and emissions of three major pollutants (COD for water; TSP and S02 for
air), along with the quality of plants' environmental management.  Figure 3 shows that
the ratings are much simpler in Hohhot than in Zhenjiang.
Ratings construction
In Hohhot, development of the ratings system coincided with meetings to build
support for the concept from government agencies, the general public  and the affected
industry sectors.  The assessment work utilized data collected by the Environmental
Supervision Station of Hohhot City for the year 1999.  Ratings were developed during the
period December,  1998 to December,  1999,  and several review meetings were conducted
prior to official disclosure in March,  2000.  As in Zhenjiang,  a pilot ratings exercise was
undertaken in consultation  with affected enterprises before the ratings were disclosed to
the public.
4.2  Program Implementation
On March 24, 2000, the Hohhot City government convened a news conference to
disclose the environmental  performance ratings to the public.  Participants included the
program development team, other government agencies, representatives  from China's
State Environmental  Protection Administration (SEPA),  and representatives  from the 56
industrial enterprises  and  51 other institutions that were rated.  Major central and regional
16media also attended.  Broadcast news programs featured stories about the disclosure for
several days after the event.
As in the case of Zhenjiang, the evidence  suggests that many polluters responded to
public ratings of their environmental performance.  After disclosure, large, persistent
polluters such as the Hohhot Power Plant and the Hohhot Cement Mill repeatedly sent
deputies to the Hohhot EPB to discuss how they could improve their ratings and made
pollution abatement investments.  As Figure 4 shows, the 56 industrial enterprises rated
in Hohhot greatly improved their environmental performance during the period 1999 -
2000.  Enterprises  rated Good or better increased  from 24% to 62%, and enterprises in
the worst (Black) category decreased from 11%  to 5%.  As in Zhenjiang, this
improvement undoubtedly reflected pressure from both the OCDA and public disclosure
programs.
5.  Lessons  Learned
Experiments with environmental performance  disclosure continue to expand in
China.  After observing the results in Hohhot and Zhenjiang, the EPB of Jiangsu Province
decided to implement disclosure in its  13 municipalities in 2001.  As of June, 2002, about
2,500 firms have been included in the GreenWatch program.
The evidence to date suggests that public disclosure of environmental  performance
can be an effective new component of China's system for regulating pollution.
Implementation should be feasible in most areas, because technical and design issues are
not overly complex, and supporting expertise is available in almost every city of China.
With some training and consulting services,  there should be no technical barrier to
17implementation  of disclosure in the entire country.  The case studies of Zhenjiang and
Hohhot suggest that the costs of design and implementation  are not high in China, since
most of the necessary information  already exists in the records of local Environmental
Protection Bureaus.  However,  it might well be appropriate for China's highly-varied
regions to institute ratings criteria and procedures that reflect their special circumstances.
The Zhenjiang  and Hohhot experiences have also suggested a number of important
lessons for successful implementation  of disclosure in China.  The first is that
government support and involvement are critical.  Only government can provide detailed
and credible plant-level information  for the public in China.  The case studies also
suggest that involvement of local government leaders is particularly important.  Some
municipal  EPBs at this stage are not politically strong enough to disclose plant-level
environmental performance  without explicit support from the mayors or upper-level
government agencies.  In the two case studies, city mayors supported the program after
lobbying from the local EPB and expressions of support from the central  government.
Timing is also very important in this context.  In both cities, the experience of pilot
disclosure suggests that many enterprises will improve their performance  prior to public
disclosure, if  they are informed of their ratings and given sufficient time to invest in
pollution control.  For public disclosure itself, intervals of one year between public
ratings may strike a reasonable balance between the loss of public pressure over longer
intervals and the higher cost of developing new ratings over shorter intervals.
Public disclosure clearly places unprecedented  demands on environmental  agencies'
management information  systems.  Although there are substantial  startup costs, the
agencies realize  large long-run gains from much more flexible, current and well-
18documented information  systems.  In this dimension, improved information management
with public disclosure  also yields substantial benefits  for the implementation of
conventional regulation.
The Zhenjiang and Hohhot experiences highlight the importance of several program
design and implementation issues:
1. Selection of media and pollutants: This depends on the scope of local pollution
problems,  as well as the capacity of the implementing agency.  Responding largely to the
latter concem, Hohhot could only consider major water and air pollutants in the initial phase
of its program.  By contrast, Zhenjiang's institutional capacity and information base enabled
it to include a large number of pollutants.
2.  Selection of  polluters:  Whether program participation is mandatory or voluntary, it
should be governed by clear criteria that are consistent with the relevant legal statutes.
Thus far, programs have begun with mandatory participation of large polluters, and then
expanded to cover smaller pollution sources.
3. Rating strategy  Ratings  should be clear and easily communicated to the public, in
order to mobilize continuous pressure on firms to improve their performance.  The ratings
parameters should be as objective as possible, and it is generally best to avoid constructing
indices that assign varying weights to different parameters.  The best and worst performance
ratings should reflect commonly-understood principles.  In both Zhenjiang and Holihot, the
worst rating has been assigned to firms whose emissions are both seriously non-compliant
and very damaging to the environment.  At the other end of the spectrum, the best rating
goes to world-class performers that have eamed ISO-14000 status.
194.  Disclosure strategy:  Key decisions  in this context reflect technical, legal, social
and political considerations.  Characteristic problems include the choice of colors, the
sequencing of pilot and public disclosure,  how frequently to disclose, appropriate media
strategy, etc.
5. Data quality:  The credibility of public disclosure depends on the credibility of
the information  that is used for ratings construction.  Therefore,  an institutional decision to
adopt disclosure is also a commitment to rigorous standards  for collection, verification,
storage and retrieval of information about polluters.  For a disclosure program to be
continuously  effective,  accurate  data recording, processing  and presentation are crucial.
6.  Mobilizing stakeholder support:  Strong disclosure programs require effective
identification and mobilization of supporting constituencies.  The underlying political and
social factors are highly specific to each region.
7. Institutional arrangements:  Differing local  circumstances may dictate differing
roles for governmental and non-governmental  institutions in data collection, ratings
construction, certification  of accuracy, and pubic dissemination.
6.  Discussion  and Conclusions
Recent research has shown that public disclosure provides  a promising complement
to conventional regulation through several  channels.  The first is  "informal regulation,"
or community pressure  on polluters.  Even low-income communities  have proven willing
and able to penalize  polluters when information about their emissions  is available.
Abundant evidence from Asia and Latin America shows that neighboring communities
can strongly influence factories'  environmental  performance  (e.g.,  Pargal and Wheeler,
201996).  Where formal regulators are present, communities use the political process to
influence the strictness of enforcement.  Where regulators  are absent or ineffective,
nongovernmental  organizations and community groups apply pressure through a variety
of channels, including religious institutions, social organizations,  citizens' movements,
and politicians.  Although the channels vary from region to region, the pattern
ever ywhere is similar:  Factories negotiate directly with local  actors in response to threats
of social, political or physical sanctions if they fail to compensate the community or to
reduce emissions.
Well-informed market agents can also play an important role in creating pressures
for environmental protection.  Bankers may refuse to extend credit because they are
worried about ehvironmental liability; consumers may avoid the products of firms that
are known to be heavy polluters.  The evidence suggests that multinational  firms are
important players in this context.  These firms operate under close scrutiny from
consumers and environmental  organizations in the high-income  economies.  Investors
also appear to play an important role in encouraging clean production.  Heavy emissions
may signal that a firm's production techniques  are inefficient.  Investors also weigh
potential financial losses from regulatory penalties and liability settlements.  Numerous
studies suggest that stock markets in both developed and developing countries react
significantly to environmental  news ( Lanoie and Laplante,  1994; Hamilton,  1995;
Lanoie et al.,  1997; Dasgupta and Wheeler,  1997).
During the past decade, a number of regulatory initiatives have attempted to use
public information to reduce pollution.  In many cases, such programs have focused on
toxic pollutants that are not covered by conventional regulation.  Examples include the
21US Toxic Release Inventory,  Canada's National Pollutant Release Inventory, the UK's
Pollutant Inventory, Australia's  National Pollutant Inventory (Tietenberg and Wheeler,
2001); a,nd UN-sponsored Pollutant Release  and Transfer Registers in Mexico, Egypt and
the Czech Republic.  Recently, the public disclosure approach has also been applied to water
pollutants in Canada, Indonesia, Philippines, India and Vietnam.
China's GreenWatch program, which reflects  the pilot program in Zhenjiang,
represents the most ambitious approach to date.  No longer a pilot exercise, the program
is unique in breadth,  covering all major air, water and toxic pollutants.  It rates the
environmental performance  of approximately 2,500 polluting enterprises in 13
municipalities of Jiangsu Province.  Evidence on results suggests that GreenWatch is a
cost-effective complement to conventional  regulation, and the successful experience of
Hohhot indicates that implementation is feasible in less-developed  regions of China.  At
present, the most pressing requirement for wider implementation  is startup financing to
overcome local inertia and administrative conservatism  in some areas.  On the basis of
currently-available  evidence, we believe that extension of GreenWatch to the whole of
China would yield strong improvements in environmental performance and a very
significant reduction in environmental damage from pollution.
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Indicator  Explanation
For each outlet, either (a) more than 80% of the pollutants
1 Discharge meeting  meet discharge  standards or (b) on average, the
the concentration  concentrations of the main pollutants meet the discharge
standards  standards.  The disposal rate for hazardous solid waste is
100%.
2 Frequently failing to  More than 50% of the pollutants  fail to meet standards.
meet the standard
3 Discharge  meeting  (1) For firms holding a discharge perrnit, pollution
3 Discharge meeting  discharge within the allowed limit;
the load-based  (2) For other firms, conformity with requirement  1 above
("discharge  meeting the standard").
4 Illegal pollution  One or more instances of illegal pollution.
Level  1: One or more pollution  accidents, each of which
imposes economic losses between RMB  1,000 yuan and
RMB  10,000 yuan.
Level 2 (any of the following):
(1) One pollution accident that imposes an economic loss
between RMB  10,000 yuan and RMB 50,000 yuan;
(2) Poisoning of employees;
(3) Pollution-induced  conflict between the factory and the
neighboring community;
(4)  Some environmental  damage.
5 Pollution accidents
Level 3 (any of the following):
(1)  One pollution accident that imposes an economic loss
between RMB 50,000 yuan and RMB  100,000 yuan;
(2)  Radiation damage to employees; crippling of
employees;
(3)  Poisoning of neighboring residents
(4)  Serious  impact on social stability
(5)  Serious damage to the environment
Level 4: One pollution accident that imposes an economic
loss of RMB  100,000 yuan or more.
6 Timely payrnent of  For eight months of the year, the discharge fee is paid
6  Timely payment of  within the stipulated twenty-day period.  For the rest of
the year, the fee is paid within two months.
7 Discharge reporting  Regular reporting and registering for all plants; monthly
and registering  emissions reports by firms holding pollutant discharge
permits.
8 Outlet control  Designated emissions outlets should be visible,
standardization  reasonably configured,  and convenient for monitoring.
269 Implementation  of  (1) Timely completion of the environental protection
the Three  Tit;  completion of the  planta  within
Synchronizations  and  pre-audit;  (2)  Ratification of the plant's EIA within the
the: stipulated  stipulated period; (3)  Full lmplementation of the
procedures for  Management Measures  for Environmental  Protection of
construction projects  Construction Projects."
Important criteria:
(1) Management structure;
(2) Number of environmental protection personnel;
10. Environmental  (3) Implementation of systems and regulations  such as the
management  Post Responsibility  System for Environmental  Protection;
System for the Operation and Management of
Environmental Protection Facilities;  System of Reporting
Environmental  Performance;  and System for Management
of Environmental  Protection Documents.
11  Proper disposition  100% residual solid waste disposal and a solid-waste
of solid wastes  comprehensive utilization  factor over 80%.
12P  ccomplaints  Validated complaints  about pollution that has significant
12  Public complaints  environmental impact.
13  Cleaner production  Completion of a clean production  audit that meets
advanced international and domestic standards.
14  ISO14000  ISO  14000 certificate awarded after passage of the
__________________  qualification  test.
27Figure 3
Perfonnance Rating Procedure  in Hohhot,  China
None of TSP, S02 & COD  N
Nieedng Concentrano6i  Stds_
N~~~~~ fl  N~~~~
All of TSP  SQ2 &'COD__  _  _  _  _  _
MeetingConcentraion  Stdds?
-Aliof TSP, S02 &c  N  OD_N
-Nectin  Load Stds? -
N
ISO 1410X  Cert.6cawe
Figure 4:  Performance Rating Results in Hohhot
Black  Blue
10.7%  3  6%  Black  Blue
--  a  llb1?sX  Yellow  15%




A. Ratings in 1999  B. Ratings in 2000
28Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2868  Universal(ly  Bad)  Service:  George R.  G.  Clarke  July 2002  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Providing  Infrastructure  Services  Scott J.  Wallsten  38526
to Rural  and Poor Urban Consumers
WPS2869  Stabilizing  Intergovernmental  Christian  Y. Gonzalez  July 2002  B. Mekuria
Transfers in Latin America:  David  Rosenblatt  82756
A Complement to National/  Steven  B. Webb
Subnational Fiscal  Rules?
WPS:2870  Electronic Security:  Risk Mitigation  Thomas  Glaessner  July 2002  E. Mekhova
In Financial Transactions-Public  Tom  Kellermann  85984
Policy  Issues  Valerie  McNevin
WPS2871  Pricing of Deposit  Insurance  Luc Laeven  July 2002  R. Vo
33722
WPS2872  Regional Cooperation,  and the  Role  Maurice Schiff  July 2002  P. Flewitt
of International  Organizations and  L. Alan Winters  32724
Regional  Integration
WPS2873  A  Little Engine  that Could  ...  Liesbet  Steer  August 2002  H.  Sutrisna
Domestic  Private Companies  and  Markus Taussig  88032
Vietnam's  Pressing  Need  for Wage
Employment
WPS2874  The  Risks and Macroeconomic  David A. Robalino  August 2002  C.  Fall
Impact of HIV/AIDS  in the Middle  Carol Jenkins  30632
East and North Africa: Why  Karim  El Maroufi
Waiting  to Intervene  Can Be Costly
WPS2875  Does  Liberte=Egalite?  A Survey  Mark Gradstein  August  2002  P. Sader
of the  Empirical  Links between  Branko Milanovic  33902
Democracy  and  Inequality with
Some  Evidence  on the Transition
Economies
WPS2876  Can We Discern the  Effect of  Branko Milanovic  August 2002  P. Sader
Globalization on  Income Distribution?  33902
Evidence from  Household Budget
Surveys
WPS2877  Patterns of  Industrial Development  Raymond Fisman  August 2002  K. Labrie
Revisited: The Role of Finance  Inessa  Love  31001
WPS2B78  On the Governance of Public  Gregorio Impavido  August 2002  P.  Braxton
Pension  Fund Management  32720
WPS2379  Externalities  in  Rural  Development:  Martin  Ravallion  August  2002  C. Cunanan
Evidence for China  32301
WPS2880  The  Hidden Costs  of Ethnic  Soumya Alva  August  2002  T. Bebli
Conflict:  Decomposing  Trends  in  Edmundo  Murrugarra  39690
Educational Outcomes  of Young  Pierella Paci
Kosovars
WPS2881  Returns to  Investment  in  Education:  George  Psacharopoulos  September 2002  N. Vergara
A  Further Update  Harry Anthony  Patrinos  30432Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for  paper
WPS2882  Politically Optimal  Tariffs:  Dorsati  Madani  September 2002  P. Flewitt
An Application to  Egypt  Marcelo Olarreaga  32724
WPS2883  Assessing the  Distributional  Impact  B. Essama-Nssah  September 2002  0. Kootzemew
of  Public Policy  35075
WPS2884  Privatization  and Labor  Force  Alberto  Chong  September 2002  H. Sladovich
Restructuring  around the World  Florencio  Lopez-de-Silanes  37698
WPS2885  Poverty,  AIDS,  and Children's  Martha Ainsworth  September 2002  H. Sladovich
Schooling: A  Targeting  Dilemma  Deon  Filmer  37698
WPS2886  Examining the  Feasibility of  Jerry  R. Skees  September 2002  E. Laguidao
Livestock  Insurance  in  Mongolia  Ayurzana  Enkh-Amgalan  82450
WPS2886  Examining the  Feasibility of  Jerry  R. Skees  September 2002  E. Laguidao
Livestock  Insurance  in  Mongolia  Ayurzana  Enkh-Amgalan  82450
WPS2887  The Demand  for Commodity  Alexander  Sarris  September 2002  M. Fernandez
Insurance  by Developing  Country  33766
Agricultural  Producers: Theory and
an Application to Cocoa in Ghana
WPS2888  A  Poverty Analysis Macroeconomic  Luiz  A.  Pereira da Silva  September 2002  R. Yazigi
Simulator  (PAMS)  Linking Household  B. Essama-Nssah  37176
Surveys with  Macro-Models  Issouf  Samake